The paper explores DiMaggio and Powell's thesis that under conditions of uncertainty organizational decision makers will mimic the behavior of other organizations in their environment. We add to their discussion by positing that managers are especially likely to mimic the behavior of organizations to which they have some type of network tie via boundary-spanning personnel. Data are presented on the charitable contributions of 75 business corporations to 198 nonprofit organizations in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area in 1980 and 1984. Using logistic regression models, we found that a firm is likely to give more money to a nonprofit that was previously funded by companies whose CEOs and/or giving officers are known personally by the firm's boundary-spanning personnel. Firms are also likely to give greater contributions to a nonprofit that is viewed more favorably by the local philanthropic elite. We also found that a nonprofit is likely to receive more money from a corporation that previously gave money to nonprofits whose directors sitzon the nonprofit's board. We concluded that managers utilize the information gathered through extraorganizational, interpersonal networks to make decisions on how to relate to other organizations in their task environment and achieve organizational ends.'
UNCERTAINTY, RATIONALITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
The study of decision making under conditions of environmental uncertainty still occupies a central position in the organizational literature. Since the pioneering work of Simon (1965; March and Simon, 1958), it has been clear that while organizational decision makers may strive to make rational (i.e., fully informed) decisions, they often find themselves making decisions with less than complete information. Often managers find they do not have information on changes in their environment, how these changes will affect their organization, or if their response to these changes will have the intended consequence or effect (Milliken, 1987) . Uncertainty is especially common in the interorganizational arena, inasmuch as the environment is made up of less than fully informed organizations that are making strategic choices in light of the strategic choices of other uninformed organizations.
networks, managers learn about options and strategies that they themselves might adopt. The sociological literature on social contagion has extensively documented how ideas, information, and technology (or know-how) spread throughout a population via social networks (see Rogers, 1983 , for a review). In general, this literature proposes that if two actors have a direct relationship with one another, they are more likely over time to think alike or behave similarly. The assumption is that actors will first exchange information and then one will persuade the other to "give it (an idea, style, or behavior) a try." Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1980) provided an excellent review of the literature that shows that members of social movement organizations, especially religious organizations, typically have been recruited by friends or acquaintances. There is also evidence of interpersonal influence effects in Coleman, Katz, and Menzel's (1966) study of medical innovation, and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have noted the importance of social networks among professionals. Those who have direct and indirect ties to peers in other organizations are able to learn about the newest innovations in treatment or organizational design. They also learn what is and what is not acceptable to various stakeholders. Ideas and behaviors may also be diffused through interorganizational networks.
We argue that network ties between boundary-spanning personnel across organizational boundaries can act as a conduit to disseminate ideas and innovations throughout an organizational field. We argued earlier that managers operating under conditions of environmental uncertainty will mimic the behaviors of other organizations; however, it is very difficult to predict whom an organization will imitate, without knowing the network of ties extenuating from the organization through its boundary spanners. It is these network ties that allow organizational decision makers to see how other organizations cope with environmental conditions similar to their own and thus get some idea as to how to behave themselves. Our theoretical rationale for this "network effect" is quite simple: decision makers are more likely to mimic those whom they know and trust, and it's through the networks of boundaryspanning personnel that they come to know and trust one another.
Mimicry, Networks, and Corporate Contributions
This paper focuses on corporate contributions to charitable organizations. In a corporate grants economy, for-profit business corporations make unreciprocated or unilateral transfer payments to not-for-profit organizations. These contributions are tax deductible and supposedly serve some public need (Useem, 1987) . This organizational field is of interest to us because it is unclear what governs the allocation of resources among grant or gift recipients, given that supply and demand are irrelevant, and because the buyer (the corporate donor) of the service that the nonprofit provides is not the ultimate consumer of the service. The beneficiaries of the donor's largess are third parties to the transaction, e.g., students, patients, audiences, neighborhood residents, etc. This means the donor can seldom tell if there is any real demand for the services the nonprofit provides or if the supply of services is adequate. As Boulding (1973: 24) pointed out, most donors 456/ASQ, September 1989 have to wait so long before they get any feedback on transactions that it is very unlikely enough discipline would develop within a grants economy to redirect the flow of resources. In contrast to market economies, in which actors can tell if they are better or worse off in a given transaction, in a grants economy the donor does not see or experience benefits until far into the future. Thus although donors-may have preferences, feedback comes so slowly that donors often do not have the information they need to rechannel their resources to realize a more beneficial and efficient (i.e., less costly) outcome.
Given the uncertainty corporate donors face, we expect they will often mimic others in their environment to whom they have some ties. For instance, companies will look to opinionleaders in the corporate philanthropic community, respected corporate executives who have spent a great deal of -time working with nonprofits, and will tend to support organizations supported by these philanthropic activists. This is what Galaskiewicz (1985b) found in the Twin Cites in an earlier study. By funding the nonprofits the elites support, organizations enhanced their own status and received recognition from the elite, so they simultaneously enhanced their own legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985b). Furthermore, firms are especially susceptible to being influenced by high-status opinion-leaders if the latter are in direct contact with the company's executives and thus often soliciting the firm for their favorite charities. Thus we expect that if a chief executive officer (CEO) is directly tied to a high-status opinionleader, the CEO's firm will contribute to organizations favored by the elite group: Hypothesis 1 (H1): Corporation i is likely to give a larger donation to nonprofit j if the nonprofit is well regarded by the local philanthropic elite.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Corporation i is likely to give a larger donation to nonprofit j if the nonprofit is well regarded by the local philanthropic elite and the company's CEO is in direct contact with the local elite.
We also expect that corporate donations will be heavily influenced by peer networks. For instance, company giving should be influenced by the opinions and behaviors of those in the social networks of giving officers. These staff members are primarily responsible for accruing information on prospective donees. According to Galaskiewicz (1985a: 646), contributions officers rely heavily on peer contacts for information regarding nonprofits. If they do not have information on a prospective donee, officers will often contact a peer in another firm. Galaskiewicz (1985a: 656) also found that if two giving officers were in direct contact with each other, they were more likely to regard the same nonprofits in their task environment as having achieved extraordinary accomplishments. In other words, if two officers are in contact with each other, they are likely to evaluate nonprofits in their task environment similarly. We expect corporations will donate to nonprofits that the contacts of their giving officer think highly of and support. If actors in the giving officer's primary network regard the nonprofit highly and fund it, it will appear less risky to the donor:
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): Corporation i is likely to give a larger donation to nonprofit j if officers in other firms who had direct ties to the giving officer of corporation i think highly of the nonprofit. Hypothesis 4 (H4): Corporation i is likely to give a larger donation to nonprofit j if the nonprofit previously received funding from firms whose giving officers have direct ties to the giving officer of corporation i.
Peer contacts among top executives of firms should also be an important source of information. Obviously these contacts are not created for the purpose of circulating information on nonprofit organizations but are created and maintained to provide information to executives on a wide range of topics. Yet we believe these contacts may be critical in influencing company contributions. As executives hear about different nonprofit organizations from their peers or see peers funding these organizations, they are more likely to direct their firms to support them with corporate donations:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Corporation i is likely to give a larger donation to nonprofit j if the nonprofit previously received funding from firms whose CEOs have direct ties to the CEO of corporation i.
There is also considerable uncertainty on the donee's side. Nonprofit organizations must respond to two constituencies. On the one hand, there are clients, students, or members who are the recipients of the service the organization provides. Activities must be geared to meet their needs; however, this is not difficult, since it is easy to know what this constituency wants and needs. On the other hand, there are corporate donors, foundations, and government agencies that provide funding but do not consume the nonprofit's outputs. These actors have their own agenda, and the donee must also take these agenda into account. However, because these actors are not consumers and thus not easily accessible, it is difficult to know their priorities and what they are willing to fund.
Given the uncertainty nonprofits face, nonprofit administrators and fundraisers should find networks useful to gather information on prospective donors. Interlocking directorates with other nonprofit organizations may be an especially important source of information on prospective donors. Given that nonprofit providers typically do not have funders as clients, they have to rely, for their information, on others in the nonprofit community who have experience with funders. If one's directors are sitting on boards of nonprofits that have been funded by a corporation, there is ready access to an organization that has direct experience with the funder. Given that network ties are useful conduits through which information on the environment flows, we expect nonprofits will use their networks to secure information on prospective funders and to pursue these funders: Hypothesis 6 (H6): Nonprofit j is likely to receive a larger donation from corporation i if the corporation has previously funded nonprofits whose directors are represented on the board of nonprofit j. We also expect indirect ties to be critical in disseminating information on prospective donees and donors. In contrast to a direct contact, an indirect contact is someone whom one does not know personally but who is known to one's contacts. In graph theoretical terms, the other is at a path distance of two from ego. Ego's indirect contacts are defined by 1 Another way of thinking about network contacts is in the framework of structural equivalence (Burt, 1987). Traditionally, structurally equivalent sets are defined by similarity scores based on each actor's relational profile: actors in a structurally equivalent set have similar relational profiles. When considering the contacts of ego's principal contact, we are considering those actors in the network who are structurally equivalent to one particular actor-ego's principal alter. When considering all the contacts of ego's contacts, we are considering all those actors who are structurally equivalent to a whole subset of actors-all of ego's alters.
Mimetic Processes the set of actors directly related to ego's contacts but who have no direct relationship to ego herself.1
We expect that officers and CEOs who are in direct contact with a firm's boundary spanners will occasionally act as references or brokers, passing information to these boundary spanners about the nonprofits their friends funded. These individuals are not affiliated with companies that funded a certain nonprofit, but they know someone who is affiliated with a firm that did. If ego trusts his or her direct contacts, the information passed through these actors may be very useful and influence ego's allocations: Certainly there are other factors besides these influencing corporate contributions (see Useem, 1987) . For instance, companies are more likely to fund a nonprofit if they have previously funded it. Furthermore, research has consistently shown that companies are more likely to fund a nonprofit if they have more pretax income (Burt, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985b; Nelson, 1970) . Finally, companies are more likely to fund a nonprofit if their giving officers think highly of the organization (Galaskiewicz, 1985b). While we recognize the importance of these factors, our hypotheses focus on relational factors because mimetic processes operate at the interorganizational level. However, these other factors should be taken into account. After presenting the results of tests for our hypotheses, we present the results of additional multivariate models that included all the factors that we found significant in our bivariate analysis, as well as some of these control variables.
Finally, there is a set of variables measured on the nonprofit organization that we have not discussed but that may also have a strong impact on corporate contributions. Among these are nonprofit size, degree of professionalism, the prestige of the board, organizational mission, and a host of other variables that may influence the amount of corporate dollars nonprofits receive (Galaskiewicz, 1985b Preferences. We conducted face-to-face interviews with giving officers in 61 of the 75 firms in 1981. We approached companies only if they made contributions in 1980 and had more than 200 employees. We gave respondents a list of all 326 nonprofits in -our sample and asked them to go through the list and check off the organizations they recognized. Next we asked them to indicate those nonprofits they felt were providing very essential services to the community and to indicate those organizations they felt had achieved extraordinary accomplishments in their respective fields. This produced three arrays in which the rows were the 75 contributions officers (nonrespondents' rows received missing data codes) and the columns were the 198 nonprofits (pared down from 326). The binary entries in the three arrays indicated whether the staff person recognized the nonprofit, thought it essential, or regarded it as outstanding, respectively. These three matrices were summed, producing a single, rectangular array, XR ( We interviewed 26 of the 28 living members of the elite. In the course of the interview each of the 26 respondents was handed a list of the 326 nonprofits in the sample and was asked to indicate which organizations they recognized, thought essential, and regarded as outstanding. Each nonprofit then received a score of 1, 2, or 3 (recognize only; recognize and essential or outstanding; recognize, essential, and outstanding). We then aggregated the responses of the 26 informants. A score for each nonprofit was then entered into the vector, AN (ELITE PREFS). The higher the score for a given nonprofit, the more leaders recognized an NPO and thought it essential and outstanding. In the subsequent analysis these scores were dichotomized at the median such that those nonprofits in the second category were highly recognized and viewed as important by the elite, while those in the first category were not recognized or thought as worthy in the eyes of the elite. During the interviews with the 26 corporate philanthropic leaders in 1981, we also handed each of them a list of the 209 publicly held companies in the study and asked them to check off the firms in which they knew personally an officer or a board member-someone they knew on a first-name basis and whom they could call for lunch, drinks, or golf. We then tallied the number of philanthropic leaders who checked a given firm, and this was used as one indicator of how well a firm's executives were integrated into elite circles.
To get a second measure of corporate-elite linkages we scanned the rosters of the area's three major metropolitan clubs ( To combine these two measures of corporate-elite integration into a single construct we did a principle components analysis.3 Factor scores derived from the principle components analysis for each firm were entered into a vector, Ac (PROX TO ELITE). These scores were also dichotomized at the median. Dyadic constraints. Networks among those responsible for corporate giving programs were recovered in the course of the 1981 interviews and are summarized in Galaskiewicz (1985a). In each firm the principal functionary responsible for corporate contributions was asked to look over a list of other firms in the area and to tell us if he or she knew someone personally in these firms who was responsible for corporate contributions. We stipulated that staff in two companies were linked if staff in both companies acknowledged they knew someone in the other firm. We then derived a 75 x 75 binary adjacency matrix, Xs (OFFICER NETS), summarizing linkages among staff in different firms. However, because we had data on only 61 officers, a number of cells were assigned a missing-data code.
To reconstruct the network among the chief executive officers we obtained rosters of the boards and executives of Fortune 50 and Fortune 500 firms and the most prestigious cultural organizations and private clubs in the Twin Cities (details in Galaskiewicz, 1985b; Galaskiewicz and Rauschenbach,
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Mimetic Processes 1988). We then generated a 75 x 75 binary matrix, Xc (CEO NETS), where the entry in the cell was equal to 1 if the two CEOs belonged to the same boards or clubs over the period from 1977 to 1981 and was zero otherwise. There were no missing data.
To reconstruct the network ties among donees in 1981 we asked the administrators of the 229 nonprofits to tell us the names of those who sat on their boards of directors. After checking on the names, we pared the organizations list and constructed a 198 x 198 symmetric adjacency matrix, XB (NPO NETS), where 1 indicated that two nonprofits had the same individual(s) on their boards and zero that they did not. There were no missing data for this array either.
Multiplicative terms. We also included eight multiplicative terms in the analysis. Six of these were formed by combining the relational X variables and Y1: three were direct network variables, and three were indirect network variables. One of the remaining multiplicative variables was a network variable combined with two relational variables, and the last combined two attribute variables.
The three direct process variables were defined as follows: XsY1 measures the interaction between the donation officer's network and time 1 transactions; XcY1 measures the interaction between the CEO's club/board network and time 1 transactions; Y1XB measures the interaction between time 1 transactions and the nonprofit board interlock network. The three indirect process variables (XsXsY1, XcXcY1, Y1XBXB) measure the interactions between the direct process variables described above and the three relational variables, Xs, X0 and XB, respectively. All of these variables are described in more detail below. 
An entry in
We coded the three direct process variables so that each has three categories, and roughly one-third of the dyads are in each ordinal category. For the first two direct process variables, a low value indicates that the companies in the networks of firm i gave little or no money to nonprofit j, while a high value indicates that they did. 
Hypotheses and Models
We tested the hypotheses outlined in the theory section above, using the size of the donation made by corporate Table 1 Variables 
H8: Corporation i is likely to give a larger donation to nonprofit j if the nonprofit previously received funding from firms whose CEOs have indirect ties to the CEO of corporation i (controlling for size of the contribution at t, and the pretax income of the firm at t2): (H8) Y2 = f(XCXCYl,AT, Y1).
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We decided to use logit models with a trichotomized dependent variable for four reasons. First, the distribution across the nine categories of the dependent variable was highly skewed. Second, when we regressed log Y2 on log Y1 we found that the residuals were not normally distributed about the regression line. Third, we fit a number of logit models without collapsing the categories of Y1 and Y2 and found negligible differences between these models and models for which Y1 and Y2 had just three categories. Fourth, using only three categories for these two primary variables enabled us to add more variables to the models and thus enhance the explanatory power of the models. As mentioned in the Appendix, we judge the statistical significance of the main effects in each model by entering different main effects one at a time. as chi-squared random variables with the appropriate degrees of freedom (d.f.).
Mimetic Processes H9: Nonprofit j is likely to receive a larger donation from corporation i if the corporation has previously funded nonprofits whose directors
As can be seen in Table 2 the multiplicative terms, XsY1, XcY1, and Y1XB, while the latter contains the multiplicative terms, XsXsY1, XCXcY1, and Y1XsXs. In order to fit these models, we had to recode the variables again to keep the sizes of the associated contingency tables small. Some of these multinomial predictor variables were recoded at the median to have only two categories (low/high). Variable Y2 always had three (low/medium/high) categories. We categorized the other variables using either median splits (to obtain two-category variables) or third-splits (to obtain three-category variables). We attempted to have equal counts in the cells of the categorical variables but were not always successful, due to the skewed distributions. The models were derived by considering the relative importance of the main effects shown in Table 2 . The two models, and the test statistics for their main effects, are given in Table 3 . All of the hypothesized effects in models H10 and H11 are statistically significant. The relative strength of Y1, AT, and AN, measured in terms of differences in G2, is about the same in both models. However, the multiplicative effects are somewhat weaker in the combined models.
The next task was to assess the direction and strength of the effects we found to be statistically significant by returning to the models in which we found statistically significant main effects. We calculated the main effect parameter estimates for the variables specified in models H1-H9. The values of these parameter estimates were centered so they sum to zero for each category of the response variable, Y2. The results, and the models from which the parameters came, are presented in Table 4. 1980 corporate donations (Y1) was statistically significant in all the models. The effect parameters in Table 4 sized effect on giving: nonprofits that were recognized and valued by the elite in 1980 tended to receive greater corporate contributions in 1984. However, the pretax net income of the firm in 1984 (AT) had a curious effect on 1984 contributiohs: firms that had greater pretax net income in 1984 tended to make medium-sized contributions in 1984, while those that were less profitable tended to make smaller gifts. However, pretax net income in 1984 had almost no effect on the largest contributions. This suggests that both profitable and not-so-profitable firms made substantial gifts to charity in 1984.
The effects of all the direct and indirect network variables were as we had hypothesized. The final set of analyses focused on significant interaction effects we found in models H1 through H9 but did not hypothesize. There were remarkably few significant interaction effects. For each of the nine models, we tested every possible higher-order interaction but found only three significant effects in two models-H4 and H6. Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for the only three significant interaction Panel A in Table 5 shows that the influence of XsY1 on Y2 is different depending on whether corporation i had higher or lower earnings in 1984. If a company had higher earnings, it tended to fund nonprofits that received support from companies whose officers were in the network of its giving officer. If the company had weaker earnings, it tended to support nonprofits that received support from companies whose officers were not in the network of the firm's giving officer.
The second statistically significant interaction term also involves XsY1. Panel B in Table 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this paper was to see if mimetic processes, as described in DiMaggio and Powell (1983), had any effect on the corporate contributions of firms in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metro area. Within the larger framework of the study of organizational decision making, we wanted to assess the importance of these processes when management has to make' decisions under conditions of unusual uncertainty. We argued that, under these conditions, organizations would likely mimic the behavior or adopt the preferences of elites and other organizations in their environment.
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Our findings show that networks are critical to mimetic processes. This paper clearly demonstrates that organizational actors are more likely to mimic those organizations to which they have some interpersonal tie via boundary-spanning personnel such as giving officers and CEOs. An organization may mimic those that it thinks are particularly successful, but more likely it will mimic those organizations that it trusts. As Granovetter (1985) noted, interpersonal networks in highly competitive organizational fields are important mechanisms to sort out trustworthy information. While environmental conditions create the uncertainty that motivates organizational mimicry, it is the network ties of boundary-spanning personnel that tell us whom they will imitate and thus how they will behave. More importantly, this research needs to be replicated in different community settings and in different historical contexts. We are hesitant to generalize our findings beyond Minneapolis-St. Paul. Twin Cities' firms have a national reputation for their contributions to charity, and all the efforts to promote corporate philanthropy in the Twin Cities may have invigorated networking among giving officers and CEOs. Furthermore, the period we studied-1980 to 1984-was an era of government retrenchments and cutbacks. Both nonprofits and corporations were working under very stressful conditions, and the latter were under considerable pressure to "make-up" for government cutbacks. We are not sure how this particular historical context influenced our findings. If anything, it may have made corporations more conscientious, given that the public was closely scrutinizing their activities. If so, corporations had to be especially sure about the new nonprofits they funded, and the networks of both giving officers and CEOs would then become more important for obtaining information on prospective donees.
Despite these limitations, we believe that our findings add to the literature on strategic decision making in several ways. First, our results strongly suggest that so-called institutional processes are critical in explaining organizational behavior, as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Our research suggests that when faced with uncertainty, decision makers will mimic the behavior of other actors in their environment. If clear criteria do not exist, decision makers will try what others have done and have found to work. Second, social networks are important in determining which actors decision makers will imitate. There are several possible options that decision makers can pursue under conditions of uncertainty; there are several models that they can adapt. We have argued and shown that decision makers will mimic the behavior of those in their networks, those whom they know and trust. trix) differ from the receiving actors (the nonprofits or columns). The relational variable Y1 is also rectangular, as well as XR, the OFFICER PREF predictor variable. In addition to these three rectangular network variables, we used several attribute variables, two for the corporations and one for the nonprofits: AN (ELITE PREFS) is a nonprofit-attribute variable and Ac (PROX TO ELITE) and AT (PRETAX 84) are corporation-attribute variables. We also used several corporation-by-corporation square network variables (XW CEO NETS, and Xs OFFICER NETS), and one nonprofit-by-nonprofit square network variable (X, NPO NETS). As mentioned in the text, the square network X variables were combined with Y1 to yield a number of direct and indirect process variables that are substantively interesting predictor variables. These new combination variables were used instead of the original X variables in our models. This has the effect of making all of the "model predictor" relational variables rectangular (matrices of size 75 x 198). There are thus two kinds of variables in the models-rectangular (75 x 198) relational variables and attribute variables for either the rows (R = 75) or columns (C = 198). One of the relational variables, Y2, is always the response relational variable. The models seek to predict Y2 by functions of subsets of the attribute and relational predictor variables.
Following Wasserman and lacobucci (1 988b), let us assume we have T rectangular relational variables, Z1, Z2 . . ZT. We further assume these variables can take on any value from the set (1, 2, . . ., C) . If C = 2, we have binary relations. We also have a number of attribute variables. Attributes such as sex, race, club memberships, or attitudes can be used to partition the actors into two sets of subgroups (one for the corporations and another for the nonprofits) such that all actors in a specific subgroup are assumed to be stochastically equivalent, as defined by Wasserman and Anderson (1987). We will let T be arbitrary and ask how well we can model or predict ZT as a function of Z1, Z2, . . ZT-1 and the attribute variables, although we can just as easily predict any one of the T relational variables as a function of some subset of the others.
Our approach centers on linear models for logits, or log odds ratios (Haberman, 1978 (Haberman, , 1979 Fienberg, 1980) , derived from the state of the dyad (involving a specific corporation and a specific nonprofit) as measured on the response variable (the value of the donative transfer in 1984). These logit or multinomial response models are then fit to a contingency table that crosstabulates the attribute variables and the relational variables, using a standard log-linear model. Consider the following log odds ration: The next step is to specify a log-linear model for the joint probabilities. We categorize the corporations into a finite number of categories as specified by the corporate attribute variables. If we have U such variables, we have a Udimensional categorization. We do the same for the nonprofit variables, creating a V-dimensional categorization. We then form a U + V + T-dimensional contingency table, crossing the T relational variables with the subgroupings of the corporations and nonprofits. To fit logit models to the logits (Al), we fit log-linear models to this array. We must choose models that contain all parameters corresponding to main effects and interactions associated with corporate attributes Ac1, AC2... , Act, nonprofit attributes AN1, AN2, . . ., ANV, and relations 1, 2, . . ., T-1, since we are statistically conditioning on all attributes and all other relational variables. This is analogous to multiple regression, where, to build a predictive model for a response variable, a data analyst will estimate a regression coefficient for all explanatory variables to be fixed.
The main technical difference between these predictive models and the associative models discussed by Fienberg, Meyer, and Wasserman (1985) and
478/ASQ, September 1989
Wasserman and lacobucci (1 988a) is that, for the former, one must assume the interaction among the U + V + T-1 explanatory variables must be included in the log-linear model. The attribute variables and the dyad states at times 1, 2, . . ., T-1 are explanatory variables for the response variable (the last variable of the array), specifying the relation T dyad state. Examples of such predictive models are given in Wasserman (1987) for T = 2, and U = V = 0 and in Wasserman and lacobucci (1 988a) for T = 3 and general U and V. We refer the reader to these papers for details about models and parameters. To fit predictive models we use the standard theory for logit or multinomial response models (Fienberg, 1980: chap. 6; Agresti, 1984: chap. 6). The margins corresponding to the variables we are conditioning on are always included in the model. Any interaction of the response variable with some subset of the explanatory variables implies that a parameter subscripted by the product of the explanatory variables must be added to the predictive model. To allow these parameters to depend on the sending and/or receiving subgroups, the interactions should be crossed with variables 1 to U (for the corporations) and/or variables U + 1 to U + V (for the nonprof its). One can now see how to determine how the state of the dyad on relation T depends on the other relational variables and the attribute variables. The interactions between the last variable of the data array and the other variables specify the extent of the dependence. Further, it is straightforward to do a series of conditional likelihood-ratio tests to evaluate statistically how the explanatory variables affect the response variable. The fits of these models and the conditional likelihood-ratio statistics that test whether specific parameters are zero are evaluated by referring such statistics to chi-squared distributions with the appropriate degrees of freedom. Such test statistics and associated p-values are reported in Tables 2 and 3 . Parameter estimates, such as those in Tables 4 and 5 , are estimated using maximum-likelihood theory and are usually given as output of computer programs that fit loglinear models using iterative proportional fitting or other algorithms. We refer the reader to Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland (1975) for technical details. We note that likelihood-ratio test statistics calculated by these programs are incorrect, since the data arrays modeled by the programs contain some duplicated and other doubled entries. It is straightforward to write a simple computer program to take the fitted and observed data arrays and calculate these statistics correctly (Fienberg and Wasserman, 1981a). We used GLIM 3.77 (Payne, 1985) to fit the models reported here.
